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THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETIONARY
DECISION-MAKING BY THE POLICE*
AN INQUIRY INTO ITS CORRELATES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CONTROL
CHARLES W. THOMAS*
W. ANTHONY FITCH***

I.

INTRODUCTION
The police in democratic society are required to maintain
order and to do so under the rule of law. As functionaries
charged with maintaining order, they are part of the bureaucracy. The ideology of democratic bureaucracy emphasizes initiative rather than disciplined adherence to rules and
regulations. By contrast, the rule of law emphasizes the rights
of individual citizens and constraints upon the initiative of
legal officials. This tension between the operational consequences of ideas of order, efficiency, and initiative, on the
one hand, and legality, on the other, constitutes the principle problem of police as a democratic legal organization. 1

In recognition of the critical importance of the police function
and of the considerable impact of decision-making at this level of
the criminal justice system, the goal of our discussion here is to
examine the growing body of literature on determinants of discretionary decision-making by the police, the consequences of such deci* This article was prepared through the support of a grant from the National Science
Foundation, No. GI-39339. During our work on this more inclusive project we benefited
greatly from the advice of an Advisory Panel which included Professor Hugo Adam
Bedau, Tufts University; Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, University of Chicago; Judge
Marvin E. Frankel and Professor H. Richard Uviller, Columbia University. Each Of
these distinguished scholars have, of course, contributed much to the literature on the
criminal justice system, and our examination of police discretion has been heavily influenced by the impressive contributions made in this area of inquiry by Professor Davis.
The opinions, findings, and, recommendations presented here are, of course, solely those
of the authors and are not necessarily concurred with by either the National Science
Foundation or the individual members of our Advisory Panel.
00 B.S., McMurry College: M.A., University of Kentucky: Ph.D., University of Kentucky; Associate Professor of Sociology, Bowling Green State University.
*'
A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Harvard University; M.A., State University of
New York, Albany.
1. J.
6 (1966)

SKOLNICIZ, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
[hereinafter cited as SKOLN,,iCK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL] (emphasis omitted).
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sions, and to identify in at least a preliminary fashion some of the
mechanisms by which decision-making by the police might be more
effectively structured and controlled.
Our primary attention will be devoted to a single aspect of the
discretionary activities of the police: the decision to take a suspect
into custody. By so narrowing the focus of our discussion we limit,
of course, any detailed consideration of the considerable proportion
of police activities that are not directly related to their responsibility
2
to enforce the criminal law.
The general issue posed by the exercise of discretionary powers
by the police demands some initial comment if for no other reason
than that there are many, including a significant number who are
intimately familiar with or actually involved in police work, who
steadfastly deny that the police either do or should exercise discretion in their decision to arrest. Various reasons have been advanced
to support such a contention. Many note, for example, that the statutory mandate for full enforcement precludes any meaningful delegation of discretionary power to the police as well as any legitimate
assumption of such authority. Further, it has often been argued that
the scrutiny of police operations by the judiciary effectively blocks
their exercise of discretion, at least discretionary decisions which
could be construed as discriminatory or unjust. Further still, the police themselves have generally vigorously denied that they exercise
any discretionary judgment and have asserted thattheir subscription
to a code of professional ethics demands that they relinquish any discretionary powers that might have been inappropriately assumed previously.
The nature of legislative mandates, judicial review, and professional ethics notwithstanding, the reality of discretion in police operations is so ubiquitous that only the most naive would question its
existence. Indeed, both criminologists and legal scholars have long
2. Common misunderstandings notwithstanding, the preponderance of activities performed by the police have little to do with the enforcemen.t of criminal codes. For example,
of police activities in Syracuse, New York, James Q. Wilson, in VARIETIES OF
in his stuy
[hereinafter cited as WILSON, VARIETIES
19 (196S)
POLICE 13EHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT
OF POLICE BEHAVIOR] observes as follows:
About one fifth [of the calls received] required the officer to gather information about an alleged crime for which no suspect was thought still to
be on the scene. The patrolman's function ill this case Is mainly clericalhe asks routine questions, inspects the premises, and fills out a form. About
a third of the calls were for services that could as easily be provided-and
a different government agency or by a private firm.
In many cities are-by
Only about one tenth of the calls afforded, even potentially, an opportunity
to perform a narrow law enforcement function ...
Similar findings are reported elsewhere. See, e.g., Bercal, Calls for Police Assistance, 13
Am. BEHAV. SCI. 6S1 (1970) ; Parnas. The Police Response to Domestic Disturbance, 1967
Policeman. as Philosopher, Gu'ide
91.1 ; Cumming, Cumming, & E.dtell,
WIS. L. REV.
See also Thomas & Fitch, Prosecutoriatl DeSoc. PRoS. 276 (1965).
(lnd Friend, 12
dision Making, 13 AMu. CalM. L. REV. 507 (1975) ; Thomas & Fitch, An Iquiry into t'1
Ju venile Cou rt Dispositions,
Association Between Respondents' Personal Characteristics aId
17 W M. & MARY L. REV. 61 (1975).
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recognized that full enforcement of criminal codes in a democratic
society is a dubious goal even if it were practiced within a structure
of enforcement which provided for the requisite level of respect and
attentiveness to constitutionally guaranteed liberties. Sutherland and
Cressey have noted, for example, as follows:
[W]hile the policeman is expected to make crime dangerous for all, he also is -expected to use discretion and
to exercise certain judicial functions. He must not only
know whether a certain act violates the law, but also whether
it can be proved that the law has been violated. He must rigorously enforce the law, yet he also must determine whether
a particular violation of law should be handled by warning or
arrest, for policemen are subject to informal rules which bar
the arrest of some persons, and they are not expected to arrest every one who is known to have violated a law. The courts
would find it impossible to do their work if policemen brought
all cases into court, and policemen would be in courts so much
of the time that the force would need to be enlarged enormously. Consequently, policemen must judge and informally
settle more cases than they take into court; but the processes
by which such settlements3 are made are not within the scope
of their formal authority.
Further, in support of the premise that full enforcement, even were
it possible, would be detrimental to the goal of just enforcement,
Breitel has observed as follows:
If every policeman, every prosecutor, every court, and
every post-sentence agency performed his or its responsibility
in strict accordance with rules of law, precisely and narrowly
laid down, the criminal law would be ordered but intolerable.
Living would be a sterile compliance with soul-killing rules
and taboos. By comparison,
a primitive tribal society would
4
seem free, indeed.
Nor is the exercise of discretion to be viewed as flowing solely from
a desire to avoid an oppressive system of enforcement. Even were
this not the case, LaFave has noted as follows:
There are not sufficient resources available to the police
for them to proceed against all the conduct which the legislature may actually desire subjected to enforcement. As a consequence, discretion must be exercised in deciding :how to allocate the resources that do exist ....
In this sense, the budgetary appropriation is an establishment of policy ... and an indirect delegation of power by the legislative to the administrative branch.5
4.

SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 377 (9th ed. 1974).
Breitel, Controls in Criminal LaW Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 427 (1960).

5.

W.

3.

E.

LAFAVE,

ARREST:

THE

DECISION

TO

TAKE

A

SUSPECT

INTO CUSTODY

102

(1965)
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Thus, regarding the suggestion that discretion is not characteristic of police operations by virtue of the legislative mandate for full
enforcement, it is clear that full enforcement is not necessarily an
aspect of the legislative intent, that it is not and has never been a
practical aspect of police work, and that it would inhibit the efficient
functioning of both the police and the larger criminal justice system
of which the police are only one part. This, in turn, implies that some
level of discretionary decision-making and policy-making are and
should be a component of police work.
Even in the face of the considerable evidence that attacks any
ideal of full enforcement, numerous contemporary court decisions are
often cited in support of the premise that whatever degree of discretion remains within the power, if not the authority, of the police is
controlled by the scrutiny of trial and appellate courts. Although judicial regulation of police practices would not appear to us to be
either a technical impossibility or an inappropriate manner by which
standards of due process, and equal protection could be supported (as
for example, through increased utilization of federal injunctive actions to control or correct what could'be arguably defined as unconstitutional forms of the exercise of discretion), this is clearly not an
effective means 'by which discretion is being controlled at this time.
More importantly, this is not the real contention of those who argue
that existing levels and types of judicial scrutiny are adequate. Instead, we rather strongly suspect that advocates of this position are
really reflecting on a series of landmark Supreme Court cases.6
The problems in relying on such a mode of controlling and structuring the exercise of police power are numerous, but some defects
are particularly salient. First, when a meaningful case does reach
the appellate level, assuming that the decision rendered is not of such
an individualized character as to preclude the derivation of general
principles that are of significance for routine police activities, the implications of the decision must themselves survive multiple interpretations as the impact of the decision filters down through the various
levels of the criminal justice system. Commenting on the role of the
Supreme Court in this regard, Amsterdam has noted as follows:
The significance of the Court's pronouncements-their power
to shake the assembled faithful with awful tremors of exultation and loathing-does not depend upon their correspondence
[hereinafter cited as LAFAVE, ARREST].
6. These would clearly include but, obviously, not be limited to the following: Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). To the extent that these and associated cases are among the more salient aspects of the position advanced by those who feel
that existing judicial controls are sufficient to control improper discretionary decisions by
the police, a position we view as inherently weak in any event, we should also note that the
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with reality. Once uttered, these pronouncements will be interpreted by arrays of lower appellate courts, trial judges,
magistrates, commissioners and police officials. Their interpretation of the Pythia,
for all practical purposes, will be7
come the word of God.
Second, and perhaps of greater importance than the fact judicial
decisions, not unlike legislative enactments, must ultimately be interpreted by the very agencies at whose improper discretionary actions they are directed, one must consider the reactive nature of the
judicial process. At this time the majority of these decisions flow
from the application, broadly defined, of the exclusionary rule. The
principle flaw in such an application is obvious.
Under the exclusionary rule, judicial attention is focused upon
an evidentiary product of the practices rather than upon the
practices themselves. .
. Consequently, a judicial ruling
admitting or excluding it will seldom give occasion for a
clear-cut pronouncement concerning the legality of any one
of the underlying practices. Moreover, because these practices themselves are not the focus of the litigation, they
will usually be imperfectly explained and explored in the
record made before the courts. . . . The result, once again,
is that courts are unable to speak clearly concerning any
particular or specific rights of a criminal suspect. Still less
are they able to develop systematically any comprehensive
canon or register of suspects' rights in the context of the
entire range of police practices that affect the suspect. 8
In short, the popular image of the courts "handcuffing" the police
notwithstanding, the courts have not eliminated the exercise of discretion by the police. The people with whom the police appear most likely
to come in contact infrequently air their misgivings about police operations in the courts 9 and the courts react only to very selected asstatus of many of these decisions is questionable. Recently the Supreme Court has, for
example, denied that the constitution requires the complete exclusion of improperly obtained evidence, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974),
and it has similarly
questioned the basis of guidelines developed following Miranda, Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433 (1974). For a recent analysis of these and other apparent shifts by the Supreme

Court, see George, From Warren to Burger to Chance: Future Trends in the Administra-

tion of Criminal Justice, 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 253 (1976).
7. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Crimhial Cases, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 786 (1970).
8. Id. at 788 (emphasis added).
9. A relevant point which should be carefully injected at this point is simply that a
significant proportion of those who are arguably most likely to confront some of the
more dubious aspects of discretionary decision-making by the police, whether these are in
the form of decisions to selectively either enforce or not to enforce criminal codes, are also
quite unlikely to have the knowledge, finances and other resources that would permit and
encourage them to seek appropriate relief in the courts. Other limitations notwithstanding,
this single fact greatly red]uces the number of complaints which become the subject or
litigation and, therefore, the number of decisions which, directly or indirectly constrain or
structure police decision-making. This is, of course, quite unlike other bodies of case law
that have accumulated in areas of greater significance to those likely to have more substantial resources. For a more thorough discussion of this and other issues posed here,
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pects of police operations rather than to the far broader scope of
the exercise of police power. Even if these points were not immediately relevant, any case by case litigation in the absence of an effective means of sanctioning the inappropriate exercise of police power
is unlikely to have any enduring impact on police operations. 0
Finally, many police agencies and organizations have attempted
to depict themselves as moving away from the discretionary enforcement of criminal statutes. This desire is certainly exemplified by
such statements as that contained in the Law Enforcement Code of
Ethics developed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police,
which states in part as follows:
As a Law Enforcement Officer, ...
I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, animosities
or friendships to influence my decisions. With no compromise
for crime and with relentless prosecution of criminals, I will
enforce the law courteously and appropriately without fear
or favor, malice or ill will, never employing unnecessary
force or violence and never accepting gratuities."
This is, however, a statement of the ideal, not the real. Further,
such an idealized statement of the ethical obligations of an officer
blatantly ignores the absence of rules governing the exercise of discretion, of sanctions that might otherwise be invoked if rules were
violated, of questionable clarity in the expressed intent of legislative
bodies, of adequate financial and personnel resources, and so on. All
this attests to the presence, properly delegated or otherwise, of exceedingly broad discretionary power. Thus, with all due regard to contrary opinions, most informed observers would concur with Kenneth
Culp Davis' following assertion.
The police are among our most important policymaking administrative agencies. They make policy for peacekeeping
and service activities that consume most of their time, and
they make policy for law enforcement that takes less than
half of their time. One may wonder whether any other agencies-federal, state, or local-make so much policy that so
directly and vitally affects so many people. 2
see, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969)
[hereinaft'r
cited as DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE].
10. See generally K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975)
DAVIS, DISRET ONARY JUSTICE,
supra note 9; Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEX. L. REV. 703
(1974)
[hereinafter cited as Davis, Legal Control of the Police]; McGowan, Rule-Making
and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as McGowan,
RleMaking] ; and Wright, Beyond DiscretionaryJustice, S1 YALE L.J. 575, (1972).
11. Law Enforcement Code of Ethics as reprinted in R. KOBETZ, THE POLICE ROLE AND
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 226 (1971).
The complete text of the Low Enforcement Code of Ethics may be obtained front
the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 11 First-field Rd., Gaithersburg, Aid.

20760.
12.

Davis, Legal Control of the Police, siipra note 10, at 703-04.
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The fact that we do not find any substantial support for the
various perspectives which imply an absence of discretionary decision-making at the level of police operations must not be taken as
an indication that we view the presence of wide-ranging discretionary
activities as a negative attribute of police work. We emphatically do
3
not hold this view.1
Complex dimensions of human behavior and equally complex situations provide the raw material with which the police must work.
These materials are highly variable and thus police work, unlike the
elaborate and carefully formalized or standardized procedures which
obtain in such contexts as an assembly line in an industrial factory,
does not readily lend itself to the level of rule specificity that has
proven so effective and efficient in other, more bureaucratic settings.
This demands that adequate degrees of discretion must either be delegated to the police or the reality of the tasks which they must perform on a daily basis will require that they assume undelegated powers. Consequently, two points are clear. First, the exercise of discretion is an essential element of police work. Second, the option is not
whether to delegate discretionary authority to the police or to withhold it. In practice, discretion will be exercised in either event.
Fortunately, as noted previously, the presence of discretionary
decision-making in the hands of the police need not imply that the
enforcement of the criminal law will be capricious or discriminatory
any more than the presence of carefully articulated rules would
necessarily guarantee equitable and just enforcement. The delegation
of discretion to the police carries the potential for both flexibility and
abuse; the codification of rules can lead to both equality of treatment and intolerable rigidity.
Unfortunately, there are significant indications of flaws in the
exercise of discretion by the police at the present time. It has been
noted, for example, as follows:
The present system of discretionary selective enforcement is
thus characterized by three principal elements: an almost
total absence of formal rules or guidelines for controlling patrolmen decisions, a loosely formulated set of arrest policies
and informal rules developed to cope with the limitations of
the police officer's work environment, and a lack of effective
to deter the indiscriminate
statutory, civil or judicial controls
14
use of discretionary power. '
The fact that discretion is an inherent aspect of police work,
13. Nor, we miht add, do many other student, of the police function. See, e.g., the
positions advanced by those well-recognized scholars cited in supra note 10.
14. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, se(pra note 9. But see note 68 infro., and the related
sections of this discussion regarding the availability of control mechanisms which, however, infrequently employed, are at least at the disposal of both the police and the judiciary.
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coupled with the suggestion that the exercise of discretionary powers
presently assumed by the police is, at best, improperly structured,
rather obviously suggests that something related to the manner in
which discretion is exercised requires a modification which will so
structure decision-making that its abuses will be more visible, hence
more correctable, without eliminating the flexibility required for both
the efficient functioning of the police and support of just enforcement.
In the following sections of this discussion we will attempt to review
some of the existing evidence on two topics. First, in recognition of
the fact that it is fruitless to comment on solutions to problems involved in the exercise of discretionary decision-making by the police
without first arriving at some empirically based understanding of
the manner in which decisions are arrived at, we will examine factors which have been linked to police decision-making in the available
research literature. Second, based on the knowledge that can be derived from this literature, we will outline policy recommendations
that appear to merit serious consideration by those responsible for
police administration.
II. RESEARCH ON THE EXERCISE OF POLICE DISCRETION

A.

CHARACTERISTICS OF POLICE ORGANIZATION THAT LEAD TO THE
EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

As we move toward an overview of research that has attempted
to examine the extent to which the police exercise discretion in their
decision-making processes and the factors that have been revealed as
correlates of discretionary decision-making, it is essential that we
keep in mind the very difficult position 'in which the police now find
themselves. This position can be partially understood if we consider
the impossible task thrust upon the police by legislative bodies, the
insufficient integration of the police into the broader criminal justice
system of which they are such an integral part, and the response of
the police to the criticism they receive from many sectors of American society. Indeed, such broad structural pressures and conflicts as
these represent the types of influences which make possible and encourage discretionary decision-making by the police, and no examination of empirical correlates of police decision-making can properly
exclude comment on them.
The simplistic view of police work urged by some holds that they
serve a primarily ministerial function by enforcing, without the invocation of discretionary decision-making, the statutes that have been
enacted by the legislative bodies to whom they are subordinant. Not
only has such direct linkage between legislative enactment and enforcement never been a practical possibility, but, despite the argu-
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able hypothesis that this is their formal constitutional mandate in
most jurisdictions, it is clear that this has not been the legislative
intent. Professor Davis emphasizes this point by observing as follows:
They [legislative bodies] have spoken with three voices. The
first is the full enforcement of legislation. The second is
knowledge of an acquiescence in the police system of selective enforcement. . . . The third voice-the most powerful of the three-is appropriation of only enough for an estimated half to two-thirds of full enforcement. 15
Similarly, Tieger notes as follows:
[Olur constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection forbid legislative enactment of criminal laws that invidiously apply only to one class of persons . . . [but] there
are many situations in which the legislature gives the policeman the latitude to do precisely what the legislature is forbidden to do itself. . . .The individual policeman remains unfettered in the exercise of this judgment, and no discretionnarrowing administrative guidelines exist to check his whim,
prejudice, or favoritism. G
In short, whether by overt intent, oversight, or ineptness, legislative bodies have provided neither the requisite degree of -specificity
nor an appropriate control structure that might otherwise provide for
greater degrees of clarity and reviewability of police decision-making.
Further, although many have been tempted to view the various problems associated with the translation of legislative enactment into
police policy as necessary, benign in their impact, or both, this set
of difficulties can and probably does encourage, however unintentionally, discriminatory enforcement patterns. Law enforcement agencies
seek to perform their ill-defined responsibilities in a fashion that will
lead those who have control over them and their resources to evaluate their performance in a positive fashion. In this regard Chambliss
and Seidman have commented as follows:
The primary responsibility of the law-enforcement agencies,
then, is regarded by them to be a responsibility to those
groups that control their resources: at the state level, the
governor and the legislators; at the municipal level, the
mayor and the city council. Since legislators are themselves
bureaucratically structured, it not infrequently happens that
the major source of funds for the law-enforcement agencies
is in fact a small handful of legislators manning those leg15.

K. DAVIS,

POLICE DISCRETION

80-Si

(1975).

FOr an earlier but still basic treatment

of this issue, see LAFAVE, ARREST, supra note 5, at 61-153.
16.

Tieger,

720-21.

Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement, 1971

DuKE

L.J.

717.
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islative committees 7 which make recommendations on lawenforcement funds.1
This, in turn, provides enforcement agencies with a substantial
inducement to carry out duties in a manner that will elicit the least
criticism from those who have direct power over them.
This general principle is reflected in the fact that in the
administration of criminal law persons are arrested, tried,
and sentenced who can offer the fewest rewards for nonenforcement of the laws and who can be processed without
creating any undue strain for the organizations which comprise the legal system.'This situation is only exacerbated by the insufficient integration
of police agencies into the larger criminal justice system, particularly the fragmentation that characteristically exists between the police,
prosecutors, and courts. Thus, Howard has observed as follows:
[T]he police and the courts are often in conflict, each
attempting to control the other laterally, the police through
the decision to arrest, the prosecutor through the decision
to indict, and the courts through the control of evidence.
Though police officials do not operate in a total policy vacuum, they clearly operate more independently in fact than
in theory. 19
This does not simply create the context within which the translation of legislative intent into operational policy is made more
problematic; it has evolved in such a fashion to effectively lessen
the extent to which police discretion can be structured and reviewed
before and/or after the fact. More specifically, prosecutors and
lower courts have tended to respond to police policy only after
higher courts have demanded policy changes, and these reviews
by appellate courts, have placed far greater emphasis 'on evidentiary considerations than on the broader issues that have a considerably greater impact on a larger number of persons. Davis,
writing on the issue of better structuring police decision-making, has
focused attention directly on this problem.
The lack of a normal degree 'of judicial control is not the
product of deliberate planning, but of fortuities concerning
forms of control and the myth that the police, in enforcing
the law, have only a ministerial task. The Supreme Court
17.

W.

CHAMHI.188 & Rt.

;19 CHAMBLISS & SEIDMAN,

18.
19.

SEIDMAN,

LAW,

ORIIER AND I'OWEI,, '67

(1971)

[hereinafter cited

LAW].

Id at 266.
Howard, Law Enforcement in an Urban Society, 29 AM. PSYCH. 223, 226 (1974).
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has seen the need for increased judicial control and has supplied it through the exclusionary rule. But the exclusionary
rule reaches only two or three percent of police activities.
The police spend less than five percent of their time obtaining evidence, and much of the evidence they collect is
for purposes other than presentation in a proceeding. What
is needed is judicial control that will reach the ninety-seven
or ninety-eight percent of police activities that the exclusionary rule does not reach. How to accomplish that task remains
the problem no one has solved. °
Moreover, even if inter-agency linkages were better structured, the
structure of policy-making in police departments typically inverts the
norm in such a way to allow discretionary power to be excessively
broad at lower levels of the organization. Specifically, rather than
such decisions being largely the responsibility of more experienced
supervisory personnel, they are typically assumed by if not informally delegated to individual officers on the street. This is, of course,
contrary to the more typical organizational design in which decisionmaking power increases directly with increases in rank. In this sense,
therefore, it is not improper to depict a typical police department as
an "upside-down" organization within which the power to make and
implement important policies increases as the formal rank of an in2
dividual organizational member decreases.. 1
Finally, as if poor definitions of the police function, the absence
of effective inter-organizational relationships, and intra-departmental
problems of structuring and controlling the exercise of discretion did
not themselves sufficiently inhibit just and equitable law enforcement,
it must also be understood that the police operate within a social and
legal context that they define, not entirely without reason, as frequently being hostile, dangerous, critical, and unappreciative of their
efforts.22 This perception provides considerable reinforcement for the
tendency 'of many individual officers and departments to resist attempts at external scrutiny of police operations and policy, to sup20. Davis, Legal Control of tie Police, supra note 10, at 704 (emphasis a.dIded).
21. This observation is common to much of the police literature. See, e.g., K. DAVIS,
POLICE DiSCRETION (1975); A. RIEss, JR., THE POLICE A-ND THE PUBLIC (1971); DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, 5pr1)( note 9; SKOLNICl{, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL,
u 1pra note I:
LAFAVE, ARREST, Sflnra note 5; Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police an(l Sentenlcing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904 (1962) ; Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke
the Criminlal Process, 69 YALE L.J. 5t3 (1960).
22. It should be noted, however, that there is scant evidence to support police percePtions of so hostile a work environment. towever critical various pressure groups, the
media, and other highly visible groups may be of the police, the research literature on
public perceptions of police Performance has consistently shown that the vast majority of
citizens throughout the country are highly positive in their evaluations. See generally 1'.
ENNIS,

CRIMINAL

VICTIMIZATION

INr

THE

UNITED

STATES

(1967):

Smith

&

Hawkins,

Vie-

tihization, T.pcs3 of CitizcI-Poliee Contacts, mi(d Attitudes Toward the Police, 8 LAW &
Soc. 135 (1973); Conklin, Dilnell.ions of Community R (sponse to the Crine Problem, 18
SOC. PRoR. 374 (1971) ; Jacob, Black and "White Perceptions of Juftiec in the City, 6 LAW
& SOC. 69 (1971) ; Block, Silpport for Civil Liberties mid Support for the Police, 13 Am.
BEHAV. SCI. 7.; (1970).
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port existing norms of secrecy, and to continue on a path of noninvolvement in if not detachment from the communities they serve.
In the face of political pressure to control crime, public criticism
of the general police function, and the imposition of what the police
define as undue judicial constraints on their activities, it should be
no surprise to find that the police often see themselves as having a
common set of enemies, enemies against whom they must present a
united front. An unfortunate corollary of this conflict-fostered cohesiveness among police is, however, that they are often unwilling to
admit to the obvious fact that they necessarily engage in very broadsweeping discretion in both their policy-making and everyday operational decisions.23 This, in turn, renders the effective structuring of
discretion an exceedingly difficult task.
The net effect of these and other influences is that the daily
operations of police departments in this country are carried out within
structural, social, political and legal contexts that deprive police administrators and officers of adequately sophisticated direction, a context which is frequently perceived to be so hostile and critical that
the police themselves react in a fashion that can and often does
simply expand the scope of the problems thrust upon them from
agencies with whom they are linked and the public they are expected
to serve. To find that the exercise of virtually uncontrolled discretion
in such a context may not effectively or efficiently serve the formal
goals of justice and the assurance of each individual's right to equal
protection and due process should, therefore, surprise only the most
uninformed observer.
With these issues regarding the position in which the police typically find themselves in mind, it is possible to move toward a consideration of the available empirical research on police decisionmaking.
B.

CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE SUSPECT

THAT INFLUENCE THE DE-

CISION TO ARREST

The speculation that the operation of the criminal justice system
as a whole has a heavier impact on some social categories than on
others can be easily supported by even a superficial review of statistical information compiled by the police, courts, and correctional
agencies. This, in itself, does not necessarily mean that discriminatory decisions are being made by criminal justice agencies, but it
certainly provides a body of information that is supportive of such a
conclusion. The fact that Blacks, for example, are grossly overrepresented in the group of people who are arrested by the police can
23. A recent and more thorough examination of this point is provided in K. DAVIS, P0LICE DISCRETION 52-78 (1975).
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be interpreted to mean that the police are more likely to arrest
Blacks than Whites. On the other hand, it can also be interpreted to
mean that Blacks are more likely to be involved in criminal behavior
than are Whites and that it is their differential participation in criminality which renders them more likely targets for arrest.
On a more abstract level, of course, the suggestion is not that
the police may focus 'on such groups as minority members, those from
lower socioeconomic brackets, and so on. Instead, it is a question of
whether the police are more likely to react to those who are not in
a position to effectively protect their individual rights, those who
lack the requisite level of power to counter inappropriate decisions
that might be made. Our evaluation of the possibility of inappropriate
discretionary decision-making with regard t6 the relevance of social
background and demographic characteristics to the decision-making
process is, however, seriously limited by the absence of an adequately sophisticated body of empirical research in this area. Too frequently we have found that the relevance of such characteristics has
been assumed rather than demonstrated. Even in the relevant literature we have found that the focus of attention has most frequently
been on police reactions to juveniles to the exclusion of variables
which might influence police reactions to adults. Still, despite some
rather pronounced variations in the quality of the research that has
been conducted and the probable validity of findings that have been
reported, the available literature clearly suggests' that the manner
in which these types of variables influence police decision-making is
not nearly so simplistic as many have previously assumed.
1. Race
The extent to which race is a determinant 'of the decision to arrest
provides an initial consideration for our review. The perceived importance of race is reflected in much of the behavioral science literature.
Jerome Skolnick, in his classic work, Justice Without Trial, quotes a
passage from Westley's important research which illustrates this
point.
For the police the Negro epitomizes the slum dweller and,
in addition, he is culturally and biologically inherently criminal. Individual policemen sometimes deviate sharply from
this general definition, but no white policeman with whom
the author has had contact failed to mock the Negro, to
use some type of stereotyped categorization, and to refer
Negro in an exaggerated dialect, when
to interaction with 2the
4
the subject arose.
24.

SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, s8lpra note 1, at

81.
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Along the same general lines, Ferdinand and Luchterhand, in
commenting on earlier research on juveniles as a preface to their
1970 study ,of correlates of police dispositions of juveniles, summarize
earlier work as follows:
The fact that black adolescents receive harsher treatment
than whites at the hands of the police and courts has been
well documented in the criminological literature. A large
number of studies show essentially that black youths are
more likely to . . . be sent to court. . . ; and if sent to
court, they are more likely to receive a severe disposition
than whites ....
In the face of this evidence many observers
have concluded that the legal institutions of our society
dis25
criminate systematically and broadly against blacks.
Indeed, the data presented by the Ferdinand and Luchterhand study
show patterns of racially based discrimination even when such potentially relevant variables as age, sex, and offense type were held
constant.
These points notwithstanding, the effect of race per se on police
decision-making must be viewed as very tenuous in light of the preponderance of empirical research, some of which shows no association whatsoever between race and police decisions.2 6 Instead, much
of the apparent association between race and police decisions to arrest would appear to be a reflection of such variables as heavier
police patrol patterns in sections of cities in which Blacks frequently
reside, the types of offenses for which Blacks are apprehended, the
tendency for Blacks and other lower socioeconomic groups to congregate in public places rather than private facilities which are relatively more accessible to those from higher socioeconomic brackets,
and the response of blacks to the police when they come in contact
with them in situations that could lead to a decision to arrest. Thus,
for example, in a detailed study of police operations in Boston,
Chicago, and Washington, D. C. that was conducted in 1966, Black's
analysis
demonstrates that police arrest blacks at a higher rate than
whites. But no evidence supports the view that the police
discriminate against blacks. Rather, the race differential
seems to be a function of the relatively higher rate at
which black suspects display disrespect toward the police.
When the arrest rate for respectful black suspects is com25, Ferdinand & Luchterhand, Inner-City Youth, the Police, The Jiivenile Court, ao,?
Justice, 17 Soc. PROB. 510, 510 (1970). [hereinafter cited as Ferdinand & Luchterhand,
Inner-City Youth].
26. Terry, Discrimination in the Handling of Juvenile Offenders by Social Control
Agencies, 4 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 218 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Terry,

Juvenile Offenders].
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pared 2to
that for respectful whites, no difference
T
parent.

is ap-

Further, Williams and Gold, based on their analysis of a nationwide probability sample of juveniles, conclude as follows:
Four percent of the whites and five percent of the
blacks in our sample were found in police records. Blacks
comprised 15 percent of the 34 teenagers with records, a
chance difference from the 12 percent in the total sample.
Police. did not seem to discriminate along racial lines in
dealing with apprehended offenders: they put 17 percent of
the apprehended whites and 24 percent of the apprehended
blacks on record, not a statististically reliable difference in

dispositions .2
Consequently, despite the widely held belief that police openly
discriminate against minority group members, particularly Blacks,
our evaluation of these and other research reports leads us to infer
that the nature of this linkage is far from simplistic. Instead, the
association between ethnic origin and type of police reaction appears
to diminish considerably when other relevant factors are taken into
consideration, factors that tend to be correlated with both ethnicity
and police decisions. Thus, it would appear that simply being Black
does not appreciably influence police decisions to arrest. On the other
hand, because being Black in this society implies that one is more
likely to fall into a variety of other categories that are associated
with this ethnic membership, the odds that Blacks will be arrested
are higher than for those who are not Black.
2.

Age

A second personal characteristic which has drawn some attention, particularly in research involving juveniles, is the influence of
age on decisions to arrest. Not unexpectedly, the findings in this area
show a rather consistent tendency for the police to avoid arresting
younger adolescents unless the nature of their offense or the amount
27.*Black,
The Social Organization of Arrest, 23 STAN. L. REv. 1087, 1097 (1971) [hereInafter cited as Black, Arrest].
28.
Williams & Gold, From Dclinqucnt Behavior to Official Delinquency, 20 SOc. P1Po.
209, 223 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Williams & Gold. Delinquent Behavior]. See also A
CICOUREI.,
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
(1968)
[hereinafter cited as
CICOUREL, JUVENILE JUSTICE] : SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 1: N. GOLDMAN,

THE DIFFERENTIAL

SELECTION OF JUVENILE

OFFENDERS

FOR COURT APPEARANCE

(1963)

[hereinafter cited as GOLDIMAN, DIFFERENTIAL SELECTION] : Weiner & Willie. Decisions bV
Ji'Vienile Officcrs, 77 AM. J. Soc. 199 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Weiner & Willie, Juvenilc Officers]: Axelrad, Negro and White Iistituttionalizcd Delinquenits, 77 AM .J.
Soc.
569 (1971) ; Green, Race, Social Status, and Crimioiial Arest,
35 AM. Soc. REv. 476 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Green,
C'rimnal Arrest]: Piliavin & Briar, Police Encounters
with Juv'nilcs, 70 AM. J. Soc. 206 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Piliavin & Briar, Police

E:ncoun ters].
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of harm and damage they have caused is relatively severe. Goldman's comments on this issue reflect the general consensus of the
available literature.
There appears to be an under-representation in courts of
arrests below the age twelve, and an over-representation of arrests in the sixteen- and seventeen-year groups. It is possible,
if not probable, that the nature of the offenses of children
under age twelve is much less serious than that of the older
boys and girls. For a variety of other reasons, however, police are loathe to refer younger children to court. Some, referring back to their own early childhood' escapades, find justification for the informal rather than official treatment of
-such children. Other police, referring to court and institution
experiences as leading to habituation in the ways of delinquency, use court referral only as a last resort. Some, in
terms of their self-conceptions as professional antagonists of
the criminal, are embarrassed at having to assume a police
role with respect to a young
child. They prefer, then, to over29
look juvenile offenses.
This observation is also made by Williams and Gold in their interpretation of the linkage they observed between age and the probability of a police record for delinquency.
Several factors seem to lead police to put older offenders
on record more often. The greater frequency of their delinquent behavior in a given period of time and their longer lifespan both result in more of them being caught more than once.
...
Repeaters are more often put on record. Another factor is
the greater seriousness of the delinquent behavior the 'older
ones are caught at. Factors we have not measured probably
have some effect-police believing that older adolescents
"should know better," or are not so frightened as younger
ones by a mere warning, or are no longer so easily corrected
by their parents, and so on. It appears that official delinquency 30is more closely related to age than is delinquent behavior.
Thus, it appears that age is a determinant of police decisionmaking, at least in police dealings with juvenile offenders. On the
one hand, it could be argued that such discretion is inappropriate
in the sense that it violates a "pure" conception of equal protection.
On the other hand, leniency that is evidently shown toward younger
children would not appear to conflict with prevailing juvenile court
philosophies. One can legitimately question, however, the extent to
which the use of such screening criteria as the age of the offender
29.

GOLDMAN,

30.

Williams & Gold, Delinquent Behavior, supra note 28, at 223.

DIFFERENTIAL SELEcrION,

supra note 28, at 45.
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can be. employed by individual officers, given the probability that
the interpretation of age by individual officers will vary greatly when
no guidelines are provided by police administrators.
3. Sex
A third variable that has frequently been viewed as a determinant
of police decision-making is the sex of the individual with whom police come in contact. Recent rapid increases in reported criminal
activity notwithstanding, the general hypothesis has been that women
are not so involved in criminality as are men, that the police have
an aversion to taking women into custody unless they view it as absolutely essential, and that the police and other criminal justice agencies typically exhibit a hesitancy to react harshly to women because
of the manner in which women are traditionally defined in this culture and their belief that arrest, conviction, and confinement will
serve no useful purpose in the preponderance of cases involving women. This general set of expectations must, however, be qualified
in light of contemporary research findings, although it should again
be noted that most of the research evidence in this area is: derived
from studies of juvenile delinquency.
Williams and Gold, for example, summarize their findings with
regard to the influence of sex on police arrests of juveniles as follows:
Evidently, police put equal proportions of apprehended boys
and girls on record (19 percent and 17 percent respectively).
So six percent of the boys in our sample and two percent of
the girls were identified in some official or quasi-official police file, a ratio which parallels their ratio of getting caught.3 1
Thus, the apparent relationship between sex and decisions to arrest may more appropriately be viewed as a function of other variables. This point is borne out by the analysis conducted in a frequently cited study conducted by McEachern and Bauzer.
If different kinds of youngsters commit different kinds of
offenses (as boys and girls tend to do), then differences in the
proportions of petitions requested may be accounted for by
the kind of offense rather than the kind of youngster. ...
In the case of boys and girls this notion is borne out. When
the effects of different kinds of offenses boys and girls commit are controlled, there is no significant difference in the
proportions of petitions requested for boys and girls, although
there is a significant interaction effect. Boys are less likely
to have petitions requested for juvenile offenses and more
31.

Id.
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likely to have them requested for the more serious adult offenses.32

4.

Socioeconomic Status

A fourth variable which must be considered as a possible influence on police decision-making is the socioecon'omic status of those
who come into contact with the police. Here, as was the case in our
consideration of race as an influential factor, the problem is a complex one in the sense that we must ask whether it is social class per
se that might exert an influence 'on the decision to arrest or whether
there are variables associated with social class that give the appearance of a direct linkage between social class and the decision to arrest. A number of investigators"3 have suggested that the association
observed between race and probability of arrest is really a reflection
of bias of the police against those of lower socioeconomic origins
rather than their differential treatment of var3ous racial categories.
In this sense-, differential police reponses might be attributable to the
following factors: (1) the relatively high levels of surveillance of
those areas where those of lower socioeconomic status reside; (2) the
relatively powerless positions occupied by such individuals in our
social, economic, and political systems; (3) the orientations of those
at this level of our social structure toward authority in general and
social control agencies in particular; and (4) police perceptions that
it is from this segment of society that they can expect disproportional
involvement in criminality. Despite the fact that the situation may
be changing, our interpretation of the available evidence is that
members of lower socioeconomic segments in the population have
little to insulate them from inappropriate discretionary decisions
made by the police and even less ability to defend themselves in an
effective manner when such decisions are made. It must be noted,
however, that the literature does not uniformly support the contention that the risk of arrest is directly influenced by social class
factors.
The nationwide probability sample drawn by Williams and Gold
provides one example of an at best weak linkage between social
status and the probability of police reaction. Their analysis shows
that only among white lower status females was there a statistically
significant association between social status and arrest probabilities.3 4 Weiner and Willie, in their 1971 report on delinquency in both
Washington, D. C., and Syracuse, New York, examined the influence
32. McEachern & Bauzer, Factors Relted to Disposition in Juvenile Police Contacts,
iln JUVENILE GANGS IN CONTEXT 151 (M. Klein ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as McEachern
& Bauzer, Juvenile Police Contacts].
33.
CICOUREL, JUVENILE JUSTICE, and GOLDMAN,
DIFFERENTIAL SELECTION, supra note 28;
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 1.
34. Williams & Gold, Delinquent Behavior, supra note 28.
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of race and socioeconomic status of both individuals and the neighborhood in which the individuals lived. They concluded that neither
variable had a significant effect on the decisions made by juvenile
officers, a finding that they suggest may be attributed to the orientation of those officers that was derived from broader departmental
policy 15 Similarly, Terry's 1967 report on determinants of police,
probation department, and juvenile court decisions shows virtually
no association between socioeconomic status and police reactions.3 8
On balance, our conclusion must be that socioeconomic status
is a characteristic of both neighborhoods and individuals that can
and does set the stage for both the presence of relatively larger
numbers of police and the reaction of police officers toward those
with whom they come in contact. This is not to say that we find evidence of blatant or intentional discrimination against those of lower
socioeconomic status. It is to say that such individuals lack the
power and resources that might otherwise force officers to think
twice before making a decision or to give them the benefit of the
doubt when the arrest question is problematic. It is also to say that
discrimination on the basis of relative access to economic and political power is one of the most pervasive and difficult to control
problems in contemporary American society.
5.

Demeanor

Before concluding this subsection of our discussion, some observations should be made on an additional influence that, while not
specifically a social background or demographic characteristic, would
appear to flow rather directly from such characteristics. Specifically,
the demeanor of the individual who comes in contact with the police
has been hypothesized to be a major determinant of the outcome of
that interaction, a determinant which has been viewed by many as the
foundation for wholly inappropriate decisions by police officers.
The influence of demeanor on police decision-making is welldescribed in one of the early investigations of the topic that was
conducted by Piliavin and Briar.
Thus both the decision made in the field-whether or
not to bring the boy in-and the decision made at the station-which disposition to invoke-were based largely on
clues which emerged from the interaction between the officer and the youth, clues from which the officer inferred
the youth's character. These clues included the youth's group
affiliations, age, race, grooming, dress, and demeanor. . ..
Other than prior record, the most important of the above
35.
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clues was a youth's demeanor. In the opinion of juvenile
patrolmen themselves the demeanor of apprehended juveniles
was a major determinant of their decisions for 50-60 percent of the juvenile cases they processed. . . . The cues
used by police to assess demeanor were fairly simple. Juveniles who were contrite about their infractions, respectful
to officers, and fearful of the sanctions that might be employed against them tended to be viewed by patrolmen as
basically law-abiding or at least "salvageable." For these
youths it was usually assumed that informal or formal reprimand would suffice to guarantee their future conformity.
In contrast, youthful offenders who were fractious, obdurate,
or who appeared nonchalant in their encounters with patrolmen were likely to be viewed as "would-be tough guys"
or "punks" who fully deserved the most severe sanction:
37
arrest.
This type of finding is representative of much of the empirical
and theoretical work that has been completed on the police.3, The
general conclusion is that the police are the holders of substantial
powers regardless of whether these powers have been properly delegated or simply informally assumed. To the extent that citizens do
not acknowledge police authority through behavior defined as appropriate by police officers, they run the risk of increasing the probability of being arrested. On the other hand, recent research has
demonstrated that the relative impact on the decision-making process and the types of behavior which elicit differential responses must
be qualified. In this regard, Black and Reiss, in their analysis of
police reactions to juveniles in a 1966 study conducted in Washington,
D. C., Boston, and Chicago, observed as follows:
[I]t 'should be noted that the potential impact of the suspect's deference on juvenile dispositions in the aggregate
is necessarily limited. Only a small minority of juveniles
behave at the extremes of a continuum going from very
deferential or very respectful at one end to antagonistic
or disrespectful at the other. ...
The relationship between a juvenile suspect's deference
and his liability to arrest is relatively weak and does not
appear to be unidirectional. . . . What was not anticipated,
however, is that the arrest rate for encounters involving
very deferential suspects is also 22%, the same as that for
the antagonistic group. At3 the
two extremes, then, the arrest
9
rate is somewhat higher.
B7. Pilia.vin & Briar, Police Encounters, supra note 28, at 210-11.
38. For one of the most recent discussions of this, point see Sykes & Clark, A Theory of
Deference Exchange in Police-Civilian Encounters, 81 Am. J. Soc. 5S4 (1975).
39. Black & Reiss, Police Control of Juveniles, 35 Am. Soc. Rav. 63, 74-75 (1970) [hereInafter cited as Black & Reiss, Police Control].
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Thus, although the role played by the demeanor of a suspect in
a citizen-police encounter can easily be overstated, it would appear
reasonable to conclude that one of the factors that police weigh in
their determination of how to respond to a suspect is the suspect's
attitude toward the encounter. Should the suspect, for whatever reason, overreact in either the direction of too much or too little deference to police authority, the probability of his arrest, quite independently of what he has done or the evidence that is available which
might reflect on his guilt or innocence, is influenced. This is quite
probably a function of several factors operating at the same time,
not the least of which is the negative attitude of the police toward
those who fail to show proper respect to the police and/or their positions 4 0 and the pressure that is on the police during their encounter
with a suspect to gather a sufficient amount of information upon
which to base their arrest decision. 41 With regard to the latter point,
Petersen has suggested as follows:
The police may arrest a person as a form of punishment, such as those who become abusive and disrespectful;
however, observation suggests that the police more often
utilize the offender's attitude to determine which of those
persons they encounter would be "risks" if released. Those
offenders who have a "bad" attitude are the ones the police presume would not benefit from any consideration on
their part. The belligerent drunk is one whom the police
feel may later make a nuisance of himself, or perhaps cause
actual harm to others, such as his wife, should he reach
his home. The police are well aware that the personal violence arising4 from domestic disputes is often inflamed by
intoxication. 2
C.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VICTIM THAT INFLUENCE

THE DECI-

SION TO ARREST

Only fairly recently have criminologists devoted systematic attention to the role of the victim. This avenue of research has proven
both interesting and fruitful. With regard to the influence of victims
on the exercise of discretion by the police, however, the evidence is
particularly scarce.
Hohenstein's examination of the disposition of juveniles by the
police in Philadelphia during 1960, a study in which 504 representative cases were evaluated, provides one early illustration of the im40. Black & Reiss, Police Control, supra note 39; 'iliavin & Briar, Police Encounters,
supra note 28.
41. Petersen, Police Disposition of the Petty Offiender, 56 Soc. & SOCIl, IA.scH. 320
(1972)

[hereinafter

cited as Petersen,

Petty Offenders]; Sullivaun

Make Decisions, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 254 (1972).
42.
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&

Siegel,

How

Police

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

portance of the victim in the arrest decision-making process. His
analysis reveals the following:
[T]hree important factors were involved in determining
the disposition decision: (1) the attitude of the victim, (2) the
previous record of the offender, and (3) the seriousness of
the present event. . . . What is most interesting, however,
is the order in which they appear in the typology. Its most
striking feature is the primary role played by the attitude
of the victim. Regardless of the seriousness of the events or
the previous record of the offenders, when victims made
statements to the police that they were against prosecution,
43
offenders were "remedialed" in 96 percent of the cases.
Although this line of research has not been granted an appropriate amount of attention in more recent research, the general
hypothesis that victim-centered variables exert a pronounced impact
on police decision-making has been demonstrated fairly clearly, particularly in a sophisticated study out of which a number of reports
have been prepared by Donald Black and Albert Reiss. In one of
two important articles which appeared in 1970 that were based on
this study it was observed as follows:
[Tlhe citizen complainant frequently performs an adjudicatory function in police encounters with juveniles. In an
important sense the patrol officer abdicates his discretionary
power to the complainant. At least this seems true of the
encounters that include an expressive or relatively aggressive
complainant among the participants. . . . Police sanctioning
of juveniles strongly reflects the manifest
preferences of citi44
zen complainants in field encounters.
Similarly, in a related article Black observed as follows:
[P]olice arrest practices, in both felony and misdemeanor
situations, sharply reflect the complainant's preferences,
whether they be compassionate or vindictive. In felony situations where a citizen's testimony links a suspect to the
crime, arrest results in about three-fourths of the cases in
which the complainant specified a preference for that outcome. When the complainant prefers no arrest, the police
go against his wishes in only about one-tenth of the cases.
Passive or unexpressive complainants see the police arrest
suspects in a little under two-thirds of the situations where
the police have a complainant's testimonial evidence. Thus,
when the complainant leaves the decision to arrest wholly
43. Hohenstein, Factors Influencing the Police Disposition of Jnvenile Offenders, in DELINQUENCY: SELECTED STUDIES 146 (T. Sellin & M. Wolfgang eds. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as Hohenstein, Police Dispositi'ons].
44. Black & Reiss, Police Control, supra note 39, at 72-76.
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in police hands, the police are by no means reluctant to
arrest the felony suspect. They become strikingly reluctant
only when a complainant exerts pressure on the suspect's
behalf.
The findings for misdemeanor situations likewise show police compliance with the complainant's preference.
Plainly, therefore, the complainant's preference is a more
powerful situational
factor than evidence, though the two
45
operate jointly.
Indeed, in still another article based on the Black and Reiss
study, Black was able to demonstrate that the probability that the
police would even prepare an official report that a crime had taken
place was directly associated with complainant preferences. In his
overview of that dimension of the study's findings he noted as follows:
II. The complainant's manifest preference for police action
has a significant effect upon official crime reporting.
III. The greater the relational distance between the complainant and the suspect, the greater is the likelihood of
official recognition.
IV. The more deferential the complainant toward the police,
the greater4 is the likelihood of official recognition of the
complaint. 6
Thus, the available evidence rather clearly suggests that the
victim plays a crucial role in the exercise of police discretion. Who
he is, how he reacts toward the police, and the types of preferences
he makes known influence both the probability that an act will be
officially recognized and the type of police response. Because complainant and/or victim preferences and presentations of self are of
legally dubious applicability and because such preferences and presentations vary widely across social categories in the population, one
can only be led to conclude that research of the type discussed in
this section points to the existence of wholly inappropriate discretionary decision-making by the police, an abuse of power which is
in direct conflict with the most fundamental notions of due process
and equal protection.
D.

ASPECTS OF THE SITUATIONAL CONTEXT WHICH INFLUENCE THE

DECISION TO ARREST

Closely related to both the influence exerted by complainants and
the definitions of suspects that are developed during encounters with
45.
46.
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police are the circumstances within which these encounters take place,
the characteristics of which, unfortunately, we know very little. Despite this gap in our knowledge, what we do know suggests that
various aspects of the situation do significantly influence police decisions and that the influence may not be comparable as we move
from one type of 'social setting to another. Sullivan and Siegel, for
example, have attempted to determine the types and amounts of information that the police require in order to arrive at what they define as an appropriate decision on the course of action that they
should take, and they found that the mere presence of an audience
was frequently selected by the police as a significant factor which
they acknowledged would have an impact on their decision to ar4
rest . 7
Similarly, Petersen's analysis of police decision-making in Lexington, Kentucky, provides evidence of an additional situational component. He found a relatively strong relationship between the type of
decision and the location of police encounters with drunkeness offenders.
Although all 70 violators were encountered in public places,
the specific location where an offender is encountered appears
to be relevant to the decision of the police to arrest a subject for drunkenness. In some neighborhoods the police tend
to ignore intoxicated persons; when individuals appear similarly intoxicated on the streets of the downtown area they are
more often arrested. The overall arrest rate for encounters
in a downtown location is 62 percent, while the rate for encounters in suburban areas is only 27 percent. As a consequence, certain persons such as homeless men and lower
class persons, precisely because the drinking establishments
to which they have access are in public places where others
may see them, are more likely to be arrested for drunkenness
than others.s
Hudson's study of complaints of alleged police misconduct filed
by citizens in Philadelphia provides still another illustration of the
relevance of situational influences as well as a suggestion as to why
situational factors have an impact on police decision-making.
The social context of the interaction also conditions the type
of action to be taken. A policeman who is attempting to apprehend a citizen in a public place where the audience may
be hostile is likely to act quickly to remove himself and the
suspect. He is not likely to enter into a debate with the subject, allowing the assembled audience the chance to interfere
with the procedure. The officer knows that a gathering crowd
47.
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may cause more trouble. On the other hand, an innocent
citizen stopped by a policeman before a group of friends or
neighbors probably takes a stance that is far different from
the one he would take if no one else were present. The citizen
and the policeman both have to save face. Since the resolution may favor only one of them, there is the distinct possibility of an altercation
developing that was not part of the
49
initial interaction.
On the basis of such research as. that noted above, we are led
to hypothesize that situational factors do exert a significant influence
on police decision-making. The nature of the offense and the quality
of evidence against a suspect notwithstanding, should the police encounter a suspect in a public place, particularly a place that includes
an audience that exerts pressure on the police officer, the suspect,
or both to behave in one fashion or another, the type and degree of
reaction will be influenced. Although such influences on discretionary
decision-making may not be desired or even recognized by the participants in a situational encounter, and while these influences may
run counter to desired standards of due process and equal protection,
it is not surprising to note that they exist, given the wealth of information in indirectly related behavioral science research which indicates
that expectations and definitions which emerge in part from the situational contexts within which social behavior takes place exert a
significant effect -on a broad spectrum of behavior. On the contrary,
the real problem appears to be that this issue has stimulated too
small a body of systematic research. Thus, we are left with little
support for the hypothesis that situational factors have an influence
on police decision-making.
E.

DEPARTMENTAL

POLICIES THAT

INFLUENCE

THE DECISION

TO

ARREST

Despite the availability of a number of examinations of the structure and operation 'of police departments,5 0 our knowledge of the manner in which the structure of police operations has an impact on the
types of discretionary actions made by the police is not well understood. Specific variables that one would expect to find linked to types
of decision-making would include recruitment policies, training programs, the level of financial resources available, the manner in
which resources are allocated, the type of administrative structure,
49. Hudson, Police Encounters that Lcad to Citizen Conplaints, 18 SOC. PROB. 179, 187S8 (1970).
50. See, e.g., A. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (1971) ; \V. WN'ESTLEY, THE P1LICE: A STUDY OF LAW, CUSTOM, AND. MORALITY (1970) : WILSON, VARIETIES OF F'OLICH
HAVIOR,
s8ijra note 2 ; Banton,
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in the Con nuity,
in THE POLICE:
SOCIOLOGICAL
ESSAYS
(D.
Bordula ed. 1967) : A. 'NIFDERHOFFEIl, BEHIND THE SHIELD:
POLICE IN' URBAN SOCIE'Y (1967)
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 1;
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the quality of associations between police departments and other
public or private agencies, police-community relations, and others.
The purpose of this article is not to comment on every potential influence that emerges from the organizational character of police departments. Indeed, the paucity of research is such that too little is
known about the influence of organizational characteristics to allow
a fully detailed analysis. Instead, what we would like to suggest is
that the broad scope of discretionary decision-making power held by
police officers, power that can be demonstrated to influence the decision to arrest in ways that are inconsistent with our understanding
of the rights of citizens to due process and equal protection under the
law, is also a characteristic of police organizations.
An initial illustration of how police departmental policy influences
the probability that particular types of individuals and/or types of
behavior will be reacted to is related to the allocation of resources in
those departments, either through the physical manipulation of those
resources, or through rule-making processes which dictate the allocation of resources. Both issues are in part the consequences of a problem confronting law enforcement agencies that has been noted previously. LaFave, in his classic study, Arrest: The Decision to Take a
Suspect Into Custody, points to this problem as follows:
The police and other enforcement agencies are given the
general responsibility for maintaining law and order under
a body of criminal law defining the various kinds of conduct
against which they may properly proceed. They are then
furnished with enforcement resources less than adequate to
accomplish the entire task. Consequently, discretionary enforcement occurs in an attempt to obtain the best results
from these limited means. In this sense, the budgetary appropriation is an establishment of policy (the general level
of enforcement for which the public is willing to pay) and
an indirect delegation1 of power by the legislative to the administrative branch.5
In other words, the police have fewer resources at tiheir disposal
than would be required were they to move toward the goal of full
enforcement. They must, therefore, respond to the absence of adequate resources.
An example of the physical manipulation of resources is to be
found in the manner in which police patrol patterns are established.
It seems clear to all observers that the degree to which various
categories of the population find themselves under police surveillance
is directly associated with the probability that they will be reacted to
by the police. It is certainly a truism that police reactions will take
51.
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place in locations where the police happen to be. Thus, when police
administrators adopt one set of patrol patterns rather than some
alternative, they are so structuring police operations that some
elements of the population are more apt to come in contact with
the police than are others. Moreover, there is no question but that
such determinations are discretionary decisions. The issue of establishing patrol patterns has, of course, become a topic for sophisticated
types of police planning, a fact amply demonstrated by the work of
5 2
such researchers as Richard C. Larson.
The point, however, is that one discretionary decision by a police
administrator can alter the level of visibility of behavior in those
sectors of any geographic area, urban or otherwise, to which disproportionately high resources are allocated. This, in turn, will tend
to produce relatively higher official crime rates in those areas, rates
which provide the justification for continuing the disproportionate
allocation of resources or, not infrequently, for making the allocation
even more disproportionate.
The predictable response to this notion among those responsible
for such discretionary decisions will almost certainly be that they
allocate limited resources in such a way to provide heavier police
patrol coverage in those areas in which illicit behavior has been shown
to occur most frequently. We agree that this is the typical intent.
The problem is that the demonstration of high crime rates is in part
based on the presence of police in the target area in the past and
not simply on the frequency of citizen-reported victimizations of one
kind or another. This implies that operational decisions of this type
may provide the means by which the validity or utility of the decision
is proven independently of any true increase or decrease in the rate of
criminality, an implication that can be supported at least in part by
a fairly substantial number of studies showing that the distribution
of criminal behavior is not adequately reflected by existing police
patrol patterns .53 Further, it is not inappropriate to suggest that
operational decisions of this type may frequently reflect biases that
are not in keeping with existing standards of equity and fairness. If,
for example, disproportionate resources were to be allocated to a
sector of a city in which the population was largely Black because of
the belief that more criminality is likely to occur in the Black community, a discretionary decision would have been made, that could
exemplify a self-fulfilling prophecy simply by having made any behavior in that sector more visible to the police. Whether such decisions are made, however, is not the immediate issue. Instead, our
point is that the allocation of police resources for such activities as
52.
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police patrol of an area are among the many discretionary actions
that can alter the probability of police reactions to various segments
of the population. Such decisions are generally not public, are not
necessarily made on the basis of defensible evidence, and are not
subject to review or challenge.
Similarly, there is no effective way to deny that the policies of
police departments manipulate the allocation of police resources
through the establishment of enforcement priorities that encourage
police officers to respond to some types of behavior while ignoring or.
neglecting others5 4 In effect, this exemplifies a means by which
departmental resources are manipulated by rules, explicit or implicit,
rather than by such physical means as establishing patrol patterns.
Examples of this form of discretionary decision-making within police
departments are provided by periodic drives against drunken driving,
prostitution, gambling, homosexuality, shoplifting, and a variety of
other offenses. Broader categories of offenses may also often be defined as not meriting the utilization of police resources, and traditions
may evolve within departments that dictate non-enforcement when
offenses are trivial, when the behavior is thought to be normal for
some sub-segment of a community,f5 when the victim is part of the
offender's immediate family, and when the victim appears unwilling to testify. In all such instances, police departments have elected
to either ignore some types of offenses and offenders or to more
rigorously pursue some categories of law violators. In any event,
these decisions, not unlike those described in the previous paragraph,
represent discretionary actions that are generally not governed by
the types of rules or degrees of openness necessary to provide an
appropriate degree of reviewability.
E.

CONCLUSIONS

Our intent in the preceeding segments of this article has been to
examine the validity of the assertion that police exercise broad discretionary powers in their determination of whether and how to react
to suspects with whom they come in contact. We have not attempted
to provide an exhaustive list of the numerous variables which may
be associated with the exercise of discretionary powers assumed by
or delegated to the police. We have, however, demonstrated that discretion is a characteristic inherent in the very nature of police work,
and that the exercise of discretion can and does operate in such a
way to make some segments of the population more likely to
be arrested than others.
As emphasized earlier, we do not share the belief held by some
54,. See, e.g., LAFAVE, ARREST, supral not(- 5.
55. Id. at 110-14.
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that the exercise of discretionary decision-making by either police
departments or individual police officers is inappropriate. On the contrary, it is our belief that police could not perform their assigned
tasks effectively or efficiently without an ample degree of discretionary power.
On the other hand, this exercise of discretion should not alter
the probability of a police reaction in such a way as to discriminate
against some categories of the population in a fashion that would
tend to deprive them of their basic constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. Should the exercise of discretion operate in this manner, it
would obviously be inappropriate and deserving of control. Unfortunately, our interpretation of the existing data is that contemporary
police activities frequently do 'operate to the disadvantage of some
segments of the population, resulting in a deprivation of constitutional
rights. Thus, the following discussion will briefly identify some mechanisms by means of which the desired level of flexibility can be retained by the police, while at the same time moving toward the removal of those abuses of discretionary power that are inappropriate
in a democratic society.
III.

THE CONTROL OF POLICE DISCRETION

Having examined what is a rapidly expanding literature of police
discretion and having identified many of its correlates does not, of
course, put us in the position of knowing how its real and potential
abuses may be properly subjected to effective controls. Further, we
do not pretend to have any insights about the control of discretionary
decision making which go beyond those already available in the legal
literature, particularly the carefully conceived and presented position
advanced by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis in his work, Police Discretion.5 6 Still, a few concluding remarks on this subject seem both
necessary and appropriate.
Initially, it is imperative that we note the magnitude of the problem at hand. During 1976 it is virtually certain, in light of recent
statistical findings, to assume that the police will arrest more than
nine million suspects 57 and that many times that number will be
stopped by the police," thereby at least subjecting them to the possibility of further and more serious police reactions to their real or
presumed behavior. These police contacts will be initiated by some56. K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCiETION (1975).
57. During 1975 alone, for example, there were at least 411,000 full-time law enforcement officers and, during the same year, there were some 9.3 million arrests made for
criminal acts exclusive of traffic arrests. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Ft31, UNIFORM CRIME
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thing on the order of a half a million sworn officers who are the
employees of more than forty thousand police agencies." More importantly for our purposes here, and any notions of full enforcement
notwithstanding, the nature and outcome of this huge number of
citizen-police encounters share a set of commonalities that are, or
should be, of substantial concern.
(1) They are not controlled by nor are they a product of a
body of properly promulgated and reviewed set of administrative or operational guidelines;
(2) They typically reflect an individual officer's judgment or
preference, a judgment which is too frequently the product of
contingencies associated with a particular encounter rather
than the application of pre-existing, far more general, and more
equitable standards;
(3) Partly a reflection of the points already noted, they hold
private citizens accountable to a set of non-uniform standards
of behavior that are not necessarily consistent with legislative
intent, that are not public, and that are not necessarily systematically applied; and
(4) They are almost nowhere subject to any formal and practical review which, with or without the dubious benefits of
the exclusionary rule, might otherwise provide a means, of correcting abuses and compensating those who have been abused.")
Under our system of law it is astounding that such a large number of administrative agencies whose activities have such a direct
impact on the lives of so many have been allowed to exercise such
broad discretion under such minimal constraints.
The issue is not, as we have observed earlier, whether to respond
to the various problems posed here by determining that police should
or should not exercise discretion. Such a debate is legally sterile and
practically pointless; the police will and should be empowered to
exercise appropriate discretionary powers. Instead, the real issue is
how to encourage and require the development of a decision-making
structure within which the exercise of discretion will become more
predictable, consistent with prevailing standards of due process, and
when necessary because of intentional or unintentional abuses of discretionary power, correctable. Rather than attempting a full description of such a structure, our purposes here are adequately served by
identifying some of the more salient suggestions that have been made
by responsible students of police decision-making.
59.
60.
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We have suggested that legislative bodies will probably not proVide considerable assistance in this regard."1 We have also argued
that the extent to which the exclusiorary rule can reasonably be expected to control discretion is slight.62 This implies that police departments must move toward the development of internal controls on
the exercise of discretion. The utility of this approach has been noted
by numerous observers. Consider, for example, Judge Carl McGowan's comments on the topic.
The making of rules externally for police conduct suffers
from two principal limitations. One is the absence of direct
police involvement in the process. The other is the question
of appropriate sanctions to assure their enforcement. The two
obviously interact upon each other. It is a psychological
truism that selfe-regulation tends to command a higher degree
of observance by the regulated, if for no other reason than
that the reasonableness of the resulting command is more
self-evident. The police may be something of a special problem in this regard, but they are not exempt from the impulses
and motivations which shape human conduct generally. Increased responsibility to order one's own conduct normally
evokes a heightened sense of obligation in performance. The
police, organized in a semi-military tradition, work in that
tradition's responsiveness to going by the book, which is always less grudging if one has had a role in writing the
book. The physical structure of the police is also directed
towards discipline for failure to follow explicit commands
from above."3
Three points made in the available commentary on the issue of
rule-making deserve particular emphasis. First, the specification of
rules which might govern the exercise of discretion must come from
those intimately familiar with police work. The legislative branch is
not in a position to develop such rules even if legislators were willing
to attempt to do so (and they clearly are not). Judicial judgments
presently flow primarily from the application of the exclusionary
rule. The logical rule developer, therefore, would appear to be the
police themselves, acting with the assistance of their own legal
counsel or the staff of the prosecutor's office. Second, rules made
within police departments would, as Judge McGowan notes, do much
to increase the probability of compliance to those rules and to reduce
the feeling among members of the department that they were being
forced to adopt one policy over another because of the unwanted
and unnecessary intervention of individuals or agencies outside the
61. Remington & Rosenblum, The Crimiwiuz Law and the Legislative Process, 1960 U.
ILL. L.F. 485.
62. Id.
63. 'McGowan, Rule-Making, supra note 10. at 672-73.
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department who lack any familiarity with the daily problems of
police work. Third, and this is a critical point, the rules, once fabricated, could and should be submitted to the courts for their review
4
to insure that they are equitable, just, and constitutionally sound. 1
There are certainly those who will view the "mere" establishment
of official rules and directives as lacking much in terms of the extent to which meaningful changes in the behavior of the police would
be stimulated by such formal decisions. Without a firm means of
enforcing adherence to such directives and sanctioning non-compliance, one could argue, they would be meaningless. We would agree
with this skepticism, but only to a limited degree. There is no question but that fundamental changes in the structure of police operations would meet resistance, particularly if the demand for change
came from agencies other than the police departments themselves.
This is understandable. Few occupations or professions welcome the
demands of non-members that members change their ways of doing
things. Moreover, written rules, regardless of by whom they are
drafted or the process by which they are reviewed, revised, and
ratified, can be subverted by those whose behavior they are intended
to modify or control.
On the other hand, we would also argue that something positive
would come directly from the rule-making process. It is not necessary
that we assume in advance that the control of police discretion by
police initiated rule-making is futile because the police policies that
would be forthcoming would fail to correct the existing problem.Consider another observation by Judge McGowan.
The point [the definition and assurance of the rights
of suspects] is not an unimportant one; and it is not too
facilely to be assumed that the writing of rules by the police will inevitably be niggardly and regressive in the statement of positive rights. There is something about the very
process of having to write down on paper detailed guidelines
for one's conduct which summons rationality and elevates
principle. This is especially true if the process is highly
visible and if the rule-maker is held accountable for the
results; and police rule-making will serve the objectives of
visibility and accountability. The making of policy by the
single patrolman on the beat, of which Professor Davis so
rightly complains, will be transferred to the highest echelons
of leadership where it belongs. Certainly it is more likely
that sensitivity to individual rights will be present in a process in which rules are visibly made by responsible police
chiefs, aided by lawyers sensitive to the highest traditions
of the profession, than in a process in which individual po64. For a detailed discussion of these and related points, see K.
TION (1975) ; Davis. Legal Control of the Police, supra note 10.
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licemen are left to deal with suspects on their own.65
This, is not to say, of course, that the enforcement of rules designed to better structure the exercise of discretion, regardless of by
whom the rules might be drafted, need not specify sanctions for
those who violate agreed upon procedures. The mechanisms which
can make police behavior sufficiently open and visible so that effective review is possible will vary from department to department,
and similar variations are to be expected as ore moves from division to division within individual departments. The key to enforcement of structured discretion, as many authorities have noted, " is
that the behavior of those subject to acting in accordance with relevant policies, rules, and directives must be visible and accountable.
These notions of visibility and accountability need not, however, imply
procedures so complex to be unworkable. In this regard, for
example, a recent analysis of police discretion suggests as follows:
[I]t is not impossible for the police to supply information
on their activities. Record keeping and administrative practices generally must vary among departments due to differing organizational 'factors, budgets, spatial limitations and
manpower requirements, so it is futile to attempt to suggest
a system that would be appropriate in all contexts. However,
in a situation like that described above, the radio log could
easily be expanded to include the disposition made of each
encounter. This report could be supplemented by officers'
logs of contacts they themselves initiated but where there
was insufficient radio contact for it to be included in the
radio log. Such innovation would not substantially increase
present record keeping; it would only make it more effective .17

It is also suggested as a mechanism to assure compliance with
the record keeping requirements, that compliance be made an element in considering officers for promotions or other rewards that can
be manipulated by the departments.
Knowing that his actions are now open to review may
have a profound effect upon the officer's decision-making.
Where before he had been able to make his choices without considering their acceptability to his superiors, he must
now make that acceptability a prime concern. If his superiors
disapprove of his enforcement decisions, they may censure
him or, if their disapproval is serious enough, attempt to
discharge him. However, his superiors are not the only ones
who will be able to review his actions. Under the Iowa Freet
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dom of Information Act, officers' reports would be open to
public inspection. Any person who feels an officer has abused
his discretion would have a basis for determining the officer's usual policy. The private citizen might be able to
alter the police practice by bringing it to the attention of the
city officials or the police themselves. In the cities studied
there was a general willingness evinced to respond to specific citizen complaints if they were felt to be reasonable. 8
We do not suggest that making discretionary activities by police
subject to increased visibility, structured by rules and having violations of rules (rules which we described earlier as having been previously subjected to judicial review) sanctioned through intradepartmental actions will prove to be a panacea for all that ails this segment of the criminal justice system. Visibility, reviewability, and accountability are to be encouraged as laudable goals in and of themselves, but the issue deserves to be pushed to a further point that
we feel is at least implicit in those events where abuses of discretionary power are found: departmental rather than individual liability. This point has been more than adequately made by Davis as
follows:
Police rulemaking needs to be supported by methods for
enforcing the rules, and one of the principal methods should
be governmental liability for police torts. The change is
needed to make governmental units rather than officers liable for damages to the injured person. . . . A plaintiff
should have a remedy even if the officer is judgment-proof.
A city always pays a judgment. The statute should copy
the Federal Tort Claims Act in providing for nonjury trials; .... ..
The statute should provide for reimbursement
of successful plaintiffs' litigation expenses, including attorneys' fees. . . . Abolishing sovereign immunity is essential,
but it is not enough. The suit by the injured party against
the officer should be cut off. The injured party should collect
from the governmental unit, which then if it chooses, should
collect from the officer for a deliberate tort but not for negligence.6 9
Our recommendations for the control of police discretion are,
therefore, reasonably simple to state, despite the fact that they are
in some ways difficult to implement because of the need for both
departmental cooperation and some degree of legislative assistance.
Nevertheless, the exercise of discretion must occur within a context
that minimizes abuses of discretion and one which, when abuses do
occur, as they certainly will and do, allows them to be detected, reviewed, and corrected in a fashion which insures that the victim of
inappropriate discretion is guaranteed that he will be properly corn68. Id. at 957.
69. Davis, Legal Control of the Police, Supra note 10, at 717-19.
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pensated for the harm he has suffered. This implies, indeed demands,
that the police must be encouraged to move toward a far greater degree of accountability than has previously been characteristic of
their operations.7 ° Accountability, in turn, requires that discretion be
governed by agreed upon and carefully reviewed rules that structure
its exercise; that steps be taken to insure that police decisions which
flow from this structure of rules and policies be made visible; that alleged abuses of structured discretion be made reviewable by impartial
observers; that those found to have exercised discretion in a manner
that is demonstrably inappropriate (anrd the officer's right to due
process is no less important than any private citizen's) be properly
sanctioned; and that the private citizen who has been wronged be
able to demand and receive compensation for the harm done him in
a fashion that is equitable, efficient, and accomplishable at no cost
to him.
Only.a single additional point remains to be made, but it is quite
probably a point over which many otherwise sympathetic readers
will disagree. Ours purports to be a system wherein those who govern,
those who draft and enforce the rules by which we all live, do so
only with the advice and consent of the governed. The fact that our
law enforcement agencies are at least a step away from the legislators who are directly responsible to and recallable by their constituencies should not be a fact which demonstrates that they can
afford to be, nor be allowed to be, any less responsive to the public.
Thus, if the police, or any other segment of the criminal justice
system, are to be allowed discretionary powers, however well-structured the exercise of these powers may be or become, it is incumbent
upon them to involve the public in the development and review of
what types of discretionary decision-making are appropriate, the determination of what the limits of that discretion are to be, and a
that discretionary action
voice in the control of the structure of 71
which they have had a hand in fashioning.
70. An important question that must be raised here is whether the police should be
ciicouoaged to develop and implement satisfactory stanldards to govern pulice dis:reti',n, or,
wlhether they should be required to do so. There is substaitial support for desiring the fori'r
course of action, particularly because our experience, and that of others, seems to indicate
a greater willingness on the part of the personnel of any agency to act within the spirit
a
well as the letter of those constraints which have the charucter of being self-imposed.
Unfortunately, in our view, tile latter method is the one which is most likely to prove
effective in thc immediate future. As Davis has noted in Legal Control of the Police, supra
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